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A RETURN TO THE "BRIGHT LINE RULE" OF MIRANDA*
PAUL MARCUS**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is not intended to further the debate concerning the
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1 More than ample scholarly and judicial analysis has considered all sorts of questions raised by the Court's holding including the wisdom of the
decision,2 the development of its "code" of law enforcement,3 the
application of the Fifth Amendment, 4 the legitimacy of the "prophylactic" warnings,5 and the ultimate impact of the case.'
*

The phrase was used by Justice O'Connor m Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).

** Acting Dean and Haynes Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of

William and Mary. The thoughtful comments of my colleague Richard Williamson are
gratefully acknowledged.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. For commentary supporting the Court's holding in Miranda, see Charles J. Ogletree,
Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 1826 (1987); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1986). For commentary opposing the Court's holding in Miranda, see Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Fred E. Inbau, Overreaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982).
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationalefor the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination?,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some
Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,26 VAL. U. L. REv. 311 (1991).
5. Chief Justice Rehnquist has used the term "prophylactic" on many occasions. In New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), he wrote that "the prophylactic Miranda warnings
are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.'" Id. at 654 (alterations in original) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
The academic debate concerning these so-called "prophylactic" rules has been intense.
Compare Stephen J. Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, 54 U. CHI. L. RE v. 435 (1987) with
Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties: A Reply to ProfessorSchulhofer, 55
U. CH. L. REv. 174 (1988). In almost 20 years of teaching this subject, I confess to being
puzzled by the emphasis on the notion of prophylactic rules and the intensity surrounding
the debate. Miranda is without question the law of the land and has been reaffirmed on
many occasions. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. Moreover, to categorize the warnings requirements as not constitutionally-mandated seems to fly in the face of the holding of
the Court. After all, the Court repeatedly has said that unless warnings are given, state-
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Indeed, the view of one seasoned commentator is correct. "It is
too late in the game to reargue the anomalies of the Miranda solution to the troubling problem of confessions."' 7 Few today continue
to question either the policy basis for the opinion' or its staying
power.9 The problem is not the holding in Miranda. The problem
instead is that the holding is riddled with exceptions and strapped
with limitations. Often times somewhat lengthy and confusing factual inquiries are necessary in criminal prosecutions in which Miranda is properly raised. It is not the wisdom of the Court that
should be debated, 10 but rather the application of the decision.
Miranda today suffers from a similarly agonized case-by-case review process which still plagues dispositions involving standing
under the Fourth Amendment," and which formally was the mainments made in response to custodial interrogation cannot be admissible at trial to prove the
defendant's guilt. Whether such a mandate is characterized as a prophylactic rule or a holding essential under the Constitution seems somewhat beside the point.
6. Some commentators argue that the "harm to the effectiveness of police investigation
has been extreme." Stephen J. Markman, The Miranda Decision Revisited: Did It Give
Criminals Too Many Rights?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 15, 17 (1988). Others, such as Professor
Ogletree, contend that "in the harsh reality of a police interrogation room [the Miranda
warnings] are woefully ineffective." Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1827. Richard Uviller wrote an
incisive book, Tempered Zeal, based upon eight months he spent in a New York City precinct. During this period, Uviller observed the way in which police officers satisfied rules of
procedure. Professor Uviller quotes twice from the same experienced officer indicating the
mixed review Miranda receives in terms of the impact on the criminal justice system. At one
point the sergeant says, "the Miranda warnings do not make a particle of difference
it's just plain silly." H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 208, 209 (1988). Later,
he laments the opinion: "I think Miranda is just another way for the courts to throw out
perfectly good cases." Id. at 209.
7. UVILLER, supra note 6, at 196.
8. But see the exchange between Markman and the author, supra note 6, debating the
effect of Miranda on crime enforcement.
9. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
10. Certainly the wisdom of the case has prevailed through the years. The Justice Department and the Internal Revenue Service now routinely give Miranda warnings in connection
with criminal investigations, even when the taxpayer is not in custody. See infra notes 13036 and accompanying text. Also, the Immigration and Naturalization Service recently entered into a settlement in which the INS agreed to inform individuals arrested as illegal
aliens of their legal rights, and to offer them the opportunity to consult a lawyer. See
Marvine Howe, Legal Settlement Widens Rights of Detained Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1992, at A13.
11. In the landmark Fourth Amendment standing decision, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978), the Court announced a rule which did "not provide law enforcement officials with a
bright line between the protected and the unprotected" because the rule focused on the
individual facts which establish sufficient interests of privacy to support standing. Id. at 168
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stay for right to counsel questions under the Sixth Amendment. 12
In short, contrary to Justice O'Connor's words, Miranda no longer
provides a "bright line rule." What is needed is a clear and certain
rule, one which will respond to the foreseeable situations which
arise daily throughout the United States. I propose in this Article
such a bright line rule.

II.

WHY BRIGHT LINES WORK

Prior to the decision in Miranda, the chief challenge to the admissibility of confessions was the contention that the statement

(White, J., dissenting). The Court's recent opinion in Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91
(1990), did little to reestablish the bright line. The Court found that an overnight guest had
sufficient privacy interests and thus conferred standing on hum to attack a search of the
premises. Id. After Olsen, the lower courts have had difficulty determining what constitutes
a sufficient privacy interest. The decisions, all case specific, concerning the holding of keys,
regular use of premises, and right to exclude others, have raised various questions regarding
the application of the standing principle and whether the specific facts of the case support a
right to standing. See, e.g., United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3039 (1992); United States v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1991); Harless v. State,
577 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Taylbr, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Cases arising under the Fourth Amendment are loaded with "precedentless," case-by-case
adjudications. Two of the more noteworthy cases include Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983) (finding probable cause existed when facts of an anonymous tip coincided sufficiently
with actual events under the Court's "common sense" approach), and United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (finding an exception to the exclusionary rule when evidence is detained
in good faith).

12. In 1942, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required counsel in criminal cases
only when "special circumstances" mandated an attorney as a matter of fundamental constitutional right. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), the Court floundered in a host of cases in which it sought to apply this
doctrine to fact specific situations. See, e.g., Chewnmg v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962)
(involving a defendant who might have been able to raise a claim had he been assisted by
counsel); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (involving capital punishment).
Virtually no one contends that this kind of case-by-case analysis, either under the Fourth
Amendment or under the Sixth Amendment, gives sufficient guidance to victims, the accused, or law enforcement officials. As noted by one of the most astute observers of the
Supreme Court, former Wall Street Journalreporter and current professor of law, Stephen
0
Wermiel:
For police officers throughout the country, law enforcement grows legally more
complex all the time. The tangled web of decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court and other federal and state courts makes it difficult, and sometimes inpossible, for police officials to know precisely what the law requires of them in
searching for evidence and making arrests.
Stephen Wermiel, Recent Rulings Leave Police More Confused About What's Legal, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1985, at 1.
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had been coerced by the government.1 3 As stated by Justice Frankfurter, the question of admissibility is one of voluntariness.
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only
clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker'
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-

13. Of course, coercion was not the only basis for challenge. The privilege against selfincrimination has been part of our jurisprudence since its adoption in the Fifth Amendment
and has "enjoyed more unqualified, reverential praise than any other amendment, the First
Amendment included." Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 311. In a thoughtful article, Professor
Schulhofer demonstrates that the self-incrimination clause "has a perfectly coherent, and
indeed compelling basis." Id. at 336. Professor Uviller also extols the virtues of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by writing that "no one ever doubted that
applying physical force to induce a person to utter self-inculpatory statements amounts to
compelling that person to be a witness against himself." UVILLER, supra note 6, at 188.
Praise for the privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding, reliance on the privilege is difficult because it was used so rarely, in such extreme situations, and hardly ever in
connection with interrogation. Hence, for a long time it was not seriously argued that the
privilege operated in an effective way with respect to police interrogation. Moreover, it was
not until the Court's decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the self-incrinmation provision of the Fifth Amendment was even incorporated to apply against the States.
The potential, therefore, existed for heavy use of the privilege against self-incrimination,
even before Miranda. The reality, however, was that the Fifth Amendment privilege simply
was not viewed as a major factor in the sorts of challenges that are routinely made to the
admissibility of confessions.
Other challenges were also present. Probably the most prominent is the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule which requires an arrested person to be brought before a judicial officer
"without unnecessary delay" and any statements obtained from the accused during an undue delay will be suppressed. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451 (1957) (citing FED.
R. CRIM. P 5(a) (1946)); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The rule, however,
is based upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which do not provide for the suppression of statements if delays occur. Reliance on the Federal Rules means that Congress
can alter the rules, and that the States are not bound to follow this direction. In 1988 Congress sought to eliminate the McNabb-Mallory rule:
[Confessions] shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such
person before a magistrate
if such confession is found by the trial judge to
have been made voluntarily
and if such confession was made or given by
such person within six hours immediately following his arrest
[except
that the six hour period will not apply if the delay] is found by the trial judge
to be reasonable.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1988).
In State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1985), the state supreme court adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule for state criminal prosecutions under its judicial supervisory power. Id.
at 105.
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determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature
or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession.1 '
If the statement is not voluntarily given, it makes "the whole proceeding an effective instrument for extorting an unwilling admission of guilt, [and] due process precludes the use of the confession
thus obtained.

'15

As a standard, voluntariness works well in a limited group of
cases, prosecutions in which the government behavior is absolutely
coercive in nature. The classic case is Brown v. Mississippi 6 where
a unanimous Supreme Court reacted to the truly shocking government actions:
Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the
home of Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to
accompany them to the house of the deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered, who began to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with
the participation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to
the limb of a tree, and having let him down, they hung him
again, and when he was let down the second time, and he still
protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and
still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was
finally released and he returned with some difficulty to his
home, suffering intense pain and agony. The record of the testimony shows that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly
visible during the so-called trial. A day or two thereafter the
said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home of
the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the
prisoner towards the jail in an adjoining county, but went by a
route which led into the state of Alabama; and while on the way,
in that state, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped
the defendant declaring that he would continue the whipping
until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to
such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did so,
after which he was delivered to jail.

14. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (citation omitted).

15. Id. at 635.
16. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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The other two defendants
were made to strip and they
were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a
leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by
the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping
would be continued unless and until they confessed, and not
only confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this manner the defendants
confessed the crime, and, as the whippings progressed and were
repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail
so as to conform to the demands of their
17
torturers.
Other cases followed Brown, striking down convictions on the
basis of extreme and unsavory police actions. For example, in
Brooks v. Florida' the defendant was confined to a very small cell
which had "no external window,
contained no bed or other
furnishing or facilities except a hole flush
which served as a
commode."19 During a 14-day confinement period he was not allowed to speak with anyone outside the prison and only was given
as food "four ounces of soup three times a day and eight ounces of
water"2 0 and was thrown naked into the cell.2 ' Beecher v. Alabamaa2 2 is another case in which application of the voluntariness
standard was not difficult. In Beecher, police officers cornered the
defendant in an open field and fired a bullet into his leg. When the
defendant denied committing the crime, the police chief told him,
"If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you. ' 23 When another
officer fired his rifle next to the defendant's ear, he confessed.'
The Court had no difficulty with these cases because they involved genuinely outrageous conduct by the government. Other
cases, however, were not so clear. In Lynumn v. Illinois,25 the police lied to the defendant when they told her that her children
would be taken by strangers and that she had to talk "if [she]

17. Id. at 281-82.
18. 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 413.
20. Id. at 414.

21. Id.
22. 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam).

23. Id. at 36.
24. Id.

25. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
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wanted to see [her] kids again."2 6 The police officers in Spano v.
New York 27 also lied to the defendant. In Spano, a family friend
who was attending the police academy was brought into the interrogation process. 28 He told Spano that unless there was a confession, the friend and his family would suffer greatly 29 The interrogation was lengthy and the police repeatedly told the defendant
how his friend would suffer if the defendant did not confess.8 0 At
3:25 m the morning the defendant confessed."'
The Supreme Court in both Lynumn and Spano found violations of the Due Process Clause. 2 While the police conduct was
not nearly as extreme as in Brown, Brooks, or Beecher, the Justices
determined that the confessions were involuntary 33 Lying to the
defendants, under the circumstances involved, was coercive and resulted in unconstitutionally obtained confessions.3 4 The problem,
of course, with the use of the voluntariness test in cases such as
these is that it is almost impossible to discern any precedential
value so that others can rely properly on these opinions. Thus, one
can ask quite legitimately whether the result in Lynumn would
have been different if the deception did not relate to the defendant's children, or if the police officer did not state the matter so
directly and callously. Moreover, would Spano's confession have
been involuntary if his interrogator had not been a friend,3 5 or the
statement had not been taken in the middle of the night?
26. Id. at 531.
27. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
28. Id. at 318-19.
29. Id. at 319.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 537; Spano, 360 U.S. at 320.
33. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Spano, 360 U.S. at 320.
34. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Spano, 360 U.S. at 321-23.
35. The Court relied heavily on the petitioner's will having been overborne by sympathy
surrounding his false friend. "Petitioner was apparently unaware of John Gay's famous
couplet:
An open foe may prove a curse,
But a pretended friend is worse,
and he yielded to his false friend's entreaties." Spano, 360 U.S. at 323. In sharp contrast,
the rule in Miranda does not depend on the personality of the defendant or the
interrogator.
[I]t is irrelevant that Desire was a deputy sheriff. The protections of Miranda
are afforded to every individual and do not depend on determinations of the
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It is almost impossible to identify any precedential standard
from the voluntariness cases other than that relating to physical
violence.36 After all, the language of the Court's decisions in such
cases is hardly illuminating.37 Police officers are advised to avoid
actions which induce a confession that is "the product of gross coercion."3 " The cases, furthermore, warn government officials not to
engage in "shocking display[s] of barbarism."" The police cannot
utilize any action which "breaks the will to conceal or lie [or] even
break[s] the will to stand by the truth."4 0
The voluntariness standard is of limited value to the establishment of workable rules for the criminal justice system. By no

individual's awareness of Ins Fifth Amendment rights. Assessments of "the
knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to Ins age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with the authorities" do not change the
guarantees afforded to the individual defendant.
Desire v. Attorney General, 969 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
36. Certainly, it is not a strict rule that falsehoods by police officers will necessarily make
a statement involuntary. The cases are wholly inconsistent. See, e.g., United States v. Pinto,
671 F Supp. 41, 58 (D.Me. 1987) (holding that the defendant's confession was involuntary
because an officer falsely promised defendant that he would not go to jail if he confessed);
Sandifer v. State, 517 So. 2d 646, 648 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that even though
police falsely told defendant that his co-defendant had implicated him, the confession was
still admissible); State v. Manning, 506 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that although defendant was falsely told that medical records showed his molestation of the
victim, his confession was admissible because "use of tricks or factual misstatements in and
of itself does not render a confession involuntary" because coercion must be involved); State
v. Barner, 486 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding "[tihat police l[ymg] to a suspect
[about finding his fingerprints] does not alone meet any of the tests that require the suppression of confessions"); State v. C.J.M., 409 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holdmg that the confession was voluntary despite an officer deliberately lying to a defendant
about the impact of a blood test that supposedly proved his illegal sexual conduct); State v.
McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302, 1305-06 (N.H. 1989) (holding that a promise that defendant's
confession "would not leave the office" rendered the confession involuntary); State v. Randle, 366 S.E.2d 750, 754 (W Va. 1988) (holding that telling a defendant that his fingerprints
were found at the scene of the crime "blatantly misrepresented" the evidence and made his
statement involuntary).
37. One commentator argues that the "case-by-case due process approach" is defective in
at least two ways. Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1832-34. First, this approach is "inadequate for
evaluating the substantially different methods of coercion and inducement employed by the
police and the actual impact these methods had on a diverse group of suspects." Id. at 1833.
Second, it "provided the Court with scant opportunity to shape and direct the behavior of
law enforcement officers." Id. at 1834. I agree with Professor Ogletree's criticism.
38. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967).
39. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 415 (1967).
40. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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means, however, do I suggest that the standard is dead or that it
no longer serves any purpose .m our system. It is alive and well,
and still being used in cases, though only in those cases in which
rather extreme conditions are present.41 By definition, however, it
cannot have broad and effective impact because of the need to engage in factual, case-by-case analysis.
The Due Process Clause was not the only constitutional provision the Supreme Court reviewed in the confession cases. One
bright spot was the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The key
case is Massiah v. United States.42 The defendant was indicted,
41. The test, however, is used with much confusion. See, e.g., Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d
201 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1982). In Leon, the police officers "threatened and physically abused
[the defendant] by twisting his arm behind Ins back and choking him until he revealed
where [the victim] was being held." Id. at 202. The court found that the Due Process Clause
was not implicated because the purpose of the action was to find the victim and save a life,
not to get an incriminating statement. Id. at 203-04.
The Supreme Court made things worse with its imprecise opinion in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), in which the defendant confessed after being advised of insright
to remain silent. Id. at 160. Experts later determined that he was mentally incompetent and
suffered from chronic schizophrenma. Id. at 161. There was also a serious question about
whether this schizophrenia interfered with the defendant's volitional abilities "making his
confession involuntary." Id. at 161-62. The Court allowed the confession to be used, emphasizmg that the question was not so much voluntariness as it was coercion. Id. at 165-67.
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 167. While Connelly does not
affect cases in which the police officers take affirmative steps to coerce (physical actions,
deceptions, etc.), it shifts the emphasis from the defendant's voluntary actions to the police
officer's undue influence.
The confusion on this point is demonstrated by the following exchange between a law
professor and a police officer concerning false facts:
"You mean I can lie to him?" he asked.
"Sure," I said. "Tell him you found some fingerprints on the scene and you
sent them down to the lab. See what that produces."
There was some danger, [he] thought. If the suspect thought that the cop
was faking, the edge might be lost. But in many cases, he told me, a false fact
could be very useful in getting a conversation going. "But, are you sure I can
do that?" He was still dubious. "Wouldn't it violate his rights?"
"No," I assured him. "Once the suspect freely agrees to talk to you, he has
no right to have you tell him the whole truth about the case. And if the lie you
tell him is not the sort that is likely to make an innocent person confess, you
have nothing to worry about."
UvmLER,supra note 6, at 212. The standard enunciated in the passage is particularly noteworthy the officer can tell all lies to the suspect except those "likely to make an innocent
person confess." Id.
42. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

WILLIAM AND

MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:93

retained a lawyer, and was released on bail.4" Thereafter an undercover federal agent engaged the defendant in a conversation which
was taped surreptitiously and which contained incriminating statements made by the defendant. 4 These statements, the Court held,
were obtained in violation of the right to counsel as the criminal
prosecution had already been initiated before the interrogation.45
The right to counsel approach does not suffer from the fact-specific inquiry problem of the voluntariness approach. The rule is
straightforward. If the defendant has been charged, the government may not question him without his lawyer being present, unless the defendant affirmatively waives his right to counsel.46 The
Sixth Amendment is utilized in some criminal prosecutions in connection with confessions by defendants. 47 This approach, however,
is greatly limited by the careful statements of the Court in Massiah recognizing that the criminal prosecution had already been initiated against the defendant in the form of an indictment being
returned before the police interrogation.48 The obvious problem, of
course, arises when formal charges are brought after the interrogation. The Court thought that it avoided this particular problem m
1964 with its famous and controversial opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois.49 The opinion, sadly, just made things worse.

43. Id. at 201.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 205-06.
46. The waiver question is a serious and difficult one. In the famous Christian Burial
Speech case, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court found that the defendant
had not effectively waived his right to counsel prior to giving his post-charge confession.
Chief Justice Burger, however, could not understand how the waiver could not be present
when the confession was given "after no fewer than five warnings of his rights to silence and
to counsel." Id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
47. In jail cases especially, the Sixth Amendment claim continues to be utilized actively.
In these cases, the defendant is incarcerated after formal charges, and another inmate hears
incrininating statements from the defendant. The question becomes whether the other mmate "deliberately elicited" these incriminating responses, and did so at the behest of the
government. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 270 (1980).
48. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204. It is not only the indictment which causes the criminal
prosecution to be initiated, thus raising the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. If
the defendant has been arraigned or has received a preliminary hearing, the Sixth Amendment also would apply. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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Danny Escobedo had not yet been formally charged when he was
taken into custody.50 The author of the opinion in Massiah, Justice
Stewart, argued in Escobedo that the fact that the defendant had
not been charged "ma[de] all the difference." 5' 1 He contended that
the Sixth Amendment simply did not apply until "after the mitiation of judicial proceedings. 5 2 The majority disagreed, and began
the opinion by writing broadly of the limitations on the use of confessions. The language of Justice Goldberg is quite striking:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern,
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, m the long run, be less reliable
and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.
As Dean Wigmore so wisely said:
"[A]ny system of administrationwhich permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure
as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby.

This Court also has recognized that "history amply shows that
confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement
officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence.
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights.5 3
Had the Court left the matter to such broad language and fashioned a specific rule, Miranda would never have had to be decided.
Such a rule is simple to state: Anytime the defendant is in custody,
she must be given an attorney prior to police interrogation. The
opinion itself was as unclear as anyone could have imagined. The
Court found a violation of the Sixth Amendment where, "as here,"
the investigation focused on the defendant, the defendant was in
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 493 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 488-89 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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custody, the police interrogated the defendant, the defendant requested a lawyer, and the police did not warn of the right to remain silent.5 4 With these limitations, Escobedo becomes virtually
worthless as a reliable standard. In the two-year period between
Escobedo and Miranda, difficult questions were raised m several
cases as to whether Escobedo required a defendant to request a
lawyer, 55 or dictated that the state had to provide a lawyer to the
indigent defendant.5 6 Escobedo provided no guidance and no direction-only confusion. Miranda would quickly change that.
III.

MIRANDA AND BEYOND

The response to Escobedo was harsh. The decision offered little
to anyone in the criminal justice system. It was a sweeping yet narrow opinion; it was a muddled and confined holding. Indeed, the
question after Escobedo was not how to follow it, but whether the
Court would act quickly to reject the case and substitute something more concrete in its place. Some hoped the Court would sunply revert back to a voluntariness analysis, rejecting concerns regarding law enforcement actions which would have to be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis.5 7 Others wondered whether the Court
54. Id. at 490-91. The Court reiterated its lack of clarity, as if any reiteration was needed:
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances
here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 423 P.2d 438, 443-44 (Haw. 1967) (limiting Escobedo "to
its facts making it mandatory for the suspect to request the assistance of counsel, if the
statement is to be excluded"); State v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Ore. 1965) (holding
"that the Sixth Amendment as made obligatory by the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that before law enforcement officials can interrogate a person who is the focal suspect of a
crime, such person must effectively be informed of his right to assistance of counsel as well
as his right to remain silent").
56. See Faulkner v. United States, 368 F.2d 528, 529 (4th Cir. 1966) (per cunam) (holding
that Escobedo did not require "that a person being interviewed in connection with an investigatory inquiry
be informed of an indigent defendant's right to court-appointed
counsel").
57. Certainly that was the position taken by the dissenters in Miranda v. Arizona, 386
U.S. 436 (1966), who strongly criticized "the Court's new constitutional code of rules for
confessions." Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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would instead reject convictions based on the defendants' own confessions. 58 The Court took neither route.
My purpose is not to offer an extended analysis of Miranda.
Much scholarly work over the past twenty-five years has done that
job nicely.59 Still, before turning to an analysis of the problems Miranda raises today-and offering solutions to these problems-it is
important to review the thrust of the opinion and consider the specific holding reached.
Two points are central to an understanding of Miranda. First,
the decision is not based on a view that the actions of the police
were sufficiently coercive to raise due process concerns. In none of
the cases before the Court 0 was the confession likely to be struck
down under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court admitted
that it "might not find the defendants' statements to have been
involuntary in traditional terms."81 Second, the decision did not
rely seriously on the Sixth Amendment. 2 Writing for the Court in
58. In his book, Tempered Zeal, Professor Uviller noted that some people argued that
confessions, as a matter of principle, should not be used. UViLLER, supra note 6, at 193-95.
"The situation [of unsupervised police interrogation] presents too easy and tempting an
opportunity for the natural affirmity of interrogation and torture to reassert itself in some
form, however subtle." Id. at 193. Another ground for caution regarding confessions is police
perjury:
When cops lie,
detection is apt to be difficult. In many cases, the cop
steps up to the plate as the heavy hitter, badge shining, tone official, demeanor
cool. Without apparent strain or bravado, the cop on the stand may appear as
a modest hero, a competent collector of evidence, a precise narrator of the critical events. The incidents the cop relates are usually known only to one or two
other cops, who might coordinate their recollections. Even when possible to
procure, contradiction of the cop's version from other witnesses is often weak
and flawed by bias. If the defendant decides to offer Is story, his patent interest in the outcome usually mars his credibility.
Id. at 112.
59. See supra notes 2, 6.
60. Four individual cases were joined in the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966).
61. Id. at 457.
62. At the outset of the opinion, however, the Court appeared to rely on Escobedo and
reaffirm it:
We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and
the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution-that "No person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused
shall have the Assistance of Counsel'--rights
which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing.
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Miranda,the Chief Justice made clear that the basis of the holding
was the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self63
incrimination and not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The majority believed the process of station house interrogation
itself may do serious harm to the privilege against selfincrimination.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will
of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is
equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's
most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice.
From the foregoing, we can readily perceive an intimate connectin between the prwilege against self-incrimination and
police custodial questioning.4

Once again it should be emphasized that the setting of the interro65
gation does not necessarily make the statements involuntary
Still, these governmental actions-taking the defendant into custody and subjecting him to interrogatione 6-place the accused in
an environment which is inherently coercive. The Court concluded
Id. at 442. As Justice Harlan correctly pointed out in dissent, however, the Court's reliance
on Escobedo is misplaced. "[I]t contains no reasoning or even general conclusions addressed
to the Fifth Amendment and indeed its citation in this regard seems surprising in view of
Escobedo's primary reliance on the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 512 n.9 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. at 444.
64. Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. The Court found that before the rules were to apply, the defendant had to be both in
custody and subjected to interrogation. "By custodial interrogation, [the Court] mean[t]
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person ha[d] been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444.
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that these actions, coupled with intense police tactics,8 7 made protections necessary to insure compliance with the privilege."'
Virtually every member of the Court agreed that some protections were necessary. Justice Clark wanted the Court to return to a
case-by-case analysis, but with a twist. He would have continued to
rely on the voluntariness test but would have considered as one
69
factor whether appropriate warnings were given to the suspect.
"In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to
prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that
in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give
the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary "170
Justice White opmed that if the concern was coercive police interrogation other, more specific-and less intrusive-safeguards could
be developed.7 1 "Transcripts or observers could be required, specific time limits, tailored to fit the cause, could be imposed, or
other devices could be utilized to reduce the chances that otherwise indiscernible coercion will produce an inadmissible
confession.

' 72

In light of Escobedo and the confused voluntariness cases, however, the majority in Miranda was no longer content to rely on a
case-by-case approach. Instead, the majority established a man-

67. The Chief Justice spent a good portion of the opinion discussing improper interrogation practices which he culled from manuals popular in the field. See id. at 448-55. Such
"non-empirical" reliance drew this sharp response from Justice, and former law enforcement
official, Tom Clark:
Nor can I join m the Court's criticism of the present practices of police and
investigatory agencies as to custodial interrogation. The materials it refers to
as "police manuals" are, as I read them, merely writings m this field by professors and some police officers. Not one is shown by the record here to be the
official manual of any police department, much less in universal use in crime
detection. Moreover, the examples of police brutality mentioned by the Court
are rare exceptions to the thousands of cases that appear every year in the law
reports. The police agencies-all the way from municipal and state forces to
the federal bureaus-are responsible for law enforcement and public safety in
this country. I am proud of their efforts, which in my view are not fairly characterized by the Court's opinion.
Id. at 499-500 (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 478-79.
69. Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 535 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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date that warnings must be given, with particular emphasis on the
right to have the assistance of counsel and the right to remain silent.73 The accused must be informed of her right to say nothing,
and the Court held that the presence of counsel during questioning
74
protected that right.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with hin during interrogation
under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is
an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this
right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware
75
of this right.
Of course, it is not sufficient simply to give warnings to the suspect. Once the warnings are given, "the subsequent procedure is
clear. 1 6 If at any point during the interrogation the suspect indicates that he wishes to terminate the interrogation or wants to talk
with a lawyer, all questioning must cease.77

73. Id. at 478-79.
74. Id. at 470.
[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant
subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators,
the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a
lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced,
and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court.
The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a
fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial.
Id.
75. Id. at 471-72.
76. Id. at 473.
77. Id. at 473-74. The language of the Court in this regard seems clear. Unfortunately,
later cases have demonstrated that there is some debate as to what the suspect must do to
indicate he wishes termination and under what circumstances the police can resume questioning. See infra notes 182-214 and accompanying text.
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Like Escobedo, the Miranda decision was subject to great criticism, though sustained for a far longer period. Three arguments
need to be mentioned here, for they have an impact on the ultimate problems which have surfaced. The first criticism was most
forcefully stated by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Miranda. He asserted that the majority opinion "represents poor constitutional
law."1 7 He strongly disagreed with the majority as to the difficul-

ties found with the voluntariness test.79 For him, the fact that the
test became a case-by-case analysis was predictable and healthy 0
"Of course, strict certainty is not obtained in this developing process, but this is often so with constitutional principles, and disagreement is usually confined to that borderland of close cases
where it matters least."8 " Harlan also refused to share the majority's view that reliance on the Fifth Amendment was "not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but [was] an application of principles
long recognized and applied in other settings. 8 2 He disagreed with
the majority's historical perspective and noted that as a matter of
policy, extending the Fifth Amendment to police station confessions "has little to commend itself in the present circumstances."83
I find a good deal of force in Justice Harlan's twin arguments.
The difficulty, though, is that the history just before Miranda
demonstrated the desperate need for a fairly certain rule or direction.84 The voluntariness test offered absolutely no guidance, and
not just in the "borderland of close cases." Individuals undoubtedly were confessing while failing to understand their basic right to
remain silent, their right not to answer questions.
The other two criticisms are essentially two sides of the same
coin. One school of thought is that Miranda works too well. In the
words of Justice Harlan's dissent, the Miranda rule will "impair, if
[it] will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of
law enforcement that has long and quite reasonably been thought
78. Miranda 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 505.
80. Id. at 509.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 510.
84. See supra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
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worth the price paid for it."8' 5 While some surveys taken soon after

Miranda seemed to support this view,86 fewer and fewer mdividuals today argue strenuously that Miranda works too well in eliminating confessions which would otherwise have been made. 7 Moreover, even if sound in theory, there are other constitutional
principles at stake in restricting the evidence which would otherwise be admissible at trial. In a recent case in which the Court
refused to further limit Miranda,"s the matter was stated directly
"There is no gainsaying that arrivmg at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system." But various constitutional
rules limit the means by which government may conduct this
search for truth in order to promote other values embraced by
the Framers and cherished throughout our Nation's history. 9
The other criticism is that Miranda does not work nearly well
enough. That is, the warnings are given in a very routine, unconvincing fashion and suspects either do not believe, or refuse to believe, that their silence cannot be used against them or that having
a lawyer will not hurt their case.90 The argument was stated concisely in a short essay in Newsweek several years ago.
Others who have studied Miranda in a more systematic way
say the warnings rarely stop people from confessing. Many suspects try to exonerate themselves in the eyes of the police and
end up incriminating themselves instead; others simply don't
grasp that they have a right to remain silent."'
85. Miranda, 384o U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. See Markman, supra note 6, at 17-18.
87. This theme is very prominent in Professor Uviller's book which explores the attitudes
of "cops on the beat" toward Miranda and the requirements of Miranda. See UVILLER,

supra note 6, at 198-212.
88. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (holding that a defendant can be impeached
with a prior confession in violation of Miranda only if the defendant himself takes the stand
and contradicts the earlier statement).
89. Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980)).
90. The argument is well developed by Professor Ogletree in his article which is based, to
a large extent, on his experience as public defender for the District of Columbia. As a public
defender, Ogletree represented hundreds of criminal defendants and supervised other lawyers who represented thousands of clients in criminal cases. See Ogletree, supra note 2, at
1827 n.6.
91. Tamar Jacoby, Fighting Crime by the.Rules: Why Cops Like Miranda, Nswswax,
July 18, 1988, at 53.
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The criticisms certainly have not gone away, and doubt remains,
along with little empirical evidence, as to the degree of impact the
reading of the Miranda warnings actually has.9 2 Still, the fury regarding the fundamental principle behind Miranda has diminished
significantly.9 3 To be sure, virtually every member of the Court
over the past decade has expressly reaffirmed Miranda, even if not
exactly endorsing it.94 Moreover, it has become increasingly evi-

dent that the principle of Miranda has largely given way to a
broader theme, one in which Fifth Amendment questions-like
other constitutional questions-are answered through a very fact
specific, case-by-case approach, reminiscent of the traditional voluntariness test. As indicated above, this development is most unfortunate, for it limits much of the great value of Miranda, a hard
and clear rule that all can understand. Indeed, the current Chief
Justice-one of the harshest critics of Miranda-emphasized the
importance of such a clear governing rule.
While the rigidity of the prophylactic rules was a principal
weakness m the view of dissenters and critics outside the
92. Jacoby notes that Peter Nardulli of the University of Illinois has found that less than
1% of all cases are thrown out because of illegal confessions. Former police lieutenant James
Fyfe says that" 'hardly anybody walks'- even when a suspect does not confess or his confession is thrown out m court because of a botched Miranda warning, there is usually enough
evidence and other testimony to make a case against him." Id.
93. The debate, however, has not gone away completely. For a few of the more recent
works m the area, see Paul Marcus, Defending Miranda, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 241
(1988); Stephen J. Markman, Miranda v. Arizona, A HistoricalPerspective, 24 Am. CRIM. L.
REv. 193 (1987); see also supra note 2.
94. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Miranda "provides 'practical reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment right." Id. at 654 (citation omitted). Former Chief Justice Burger, one of the strongest critics of the opinion, wrote
that "[t]he meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices
have adjusted to its strictures." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Former critic Justice O'Connor not only reaffirmed Miranda but complained that the majority in Quarleswas creating an exception that "unnecessarily blurs the
edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes Miranda'srequirements more difficult to understand." Quarles,467 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring m part and dissentmg in part). Justice White dissented in Miranda. 384 U.S. at 526. Later, he specifically
reaffirmed Miranda and extended its holding to situations in which the suspect requests
counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). For other statements reaffirming Miranda, see Winthrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1751-55 (1993) (Souter, J.); Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (Kennedy, J.); Minnick, 498 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 461-62 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (Blackmun, J.).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:93

Court
that rigidity [has also been called a] strength of the
decision. It [has] afforded police and courts clear guidance on
the manner in which to conduct a custodial investigation: if it
was rigid, it was also precise
[T]his core virtue of Miranda
would be eviscerated if the prophylactic rules were freely [ignored] by
courts under the guise of [reinterpreting] Miranda

95

Justices Blackmun and Brennan have made similar statements,
writing for the Court. Justice Blackmun has written:
Whatever the defects, if any, of this relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request
for any attorney, Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing
police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do m
conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts
under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which
benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to
outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on
law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even
though the confession might be voluntary under traditional
Fifth Amendment analysis.96
Justice Brennan has remarked: "We recognize here the importance
of a workable rule 'to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.' ,,97
For this writer, then, it is unfortunate that so many aspects of
Miranda have become riddled by exceptions, limitations and very
particularized factual inquiries. Below I will review what I believe
to be the most significant concerns and those most directly related
to the law enforcement function. This is hardly, however, an exhaustive list. In addition to the problems to be discussed, other
exceptions, limitations, and concerns would include the public
95. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., m chambers on application for stay).
96. Fare, 442 U.S. at 718.
97. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).
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safety exception, 8 the use of confessions for impeachment purposes,9 the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of state10 0 the
-ments made in violation of Miranda,
definition of testimo1
0
1
nial responses,
the ipact of consecutive confessions, 0 2 and the
confusing doctrine surrounding the use of silence. 10 3 However,
other more pressing issues await resolution.
IV

REDEFINING THE RULE OF MIRANDA

Some would argue that the Miranda rule cannot and should not
be redefined and made more precise. Instead, it is contended, Miranda should be expanded in sweeping fashion. Indeed, one prominent commentator has called for the "Mirandizing" of Miranda so
that all defendants in custody would have "a nonwaivable right to
consult with a lawyer before being interrogated." ' 4 I am unwilling
to go that far. At the outset I note that it is hard to understand
how the right to counsel cannot be waived in the context of a custodial interrogation but can be waived in the self-representation
cases. 0 5 I believe that if we are able to return to the fundamentals
of Miranda, we need instead to limit greatly the exceptions to it,
and state the rule with clarity. If such a return can be achieved,
many of the present difficulties will be eliminated yet the mdivid98. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
99. Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (statements obtained in
violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant's testimony if inconsistent with
is prior statements) with James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990) (statements by the
defendant obtained in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach only the defendant's
testimony and not the testimony of defense witnesses).
100. The Supreme Court has never determined definitively whether Miranda covers only
the defendant's own statement or also covers the "fruits" of such statements. The Court has
implied, however, that it would not apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as
broadly in Miranda cases as it has in Fourth Amendment cases. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 305-09 (1985).
101. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 603-05 (1990).
102. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
103. Compare Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (disallowing the use of silence
for impeachment purposes because it occurred after warnings were given and because the
warnings implicitly assured that silence would carry no penalty) with Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980) (allowing the use of silence when it occurred before warnings
were given because the "fundamental unfairness present in Doyle" was not present).
104. Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1842.
105. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that lower courts erred
in forcing defendant to accept a public defender when he sought to represent himself).
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ual suspects will retain the right to make those important decisions
which will directly affect them.
The Problem Areas

A.
1.

Custody

Escobedo had painted with a wide brush concerning the application of its extremely limited protections. Ultimately, Justice
Goldberg applied the law to those who were the focus of police
investigation. 10 6 This rule could have been viewed fairly broadly
Not, of course, as broadly as an application to all those who are
being questioned by police officers. Still, the rule was far greater
than mandating the giving of warnings only to those suspects who
had been formally arrested or charged. Presumably, many more
people will be the focus of a police investigation than ultimately
will be subjected to arrest.
In Miranda,the Chief Justice rejected the focus doctrine of Escobedo by "redefining" the common meaning of the term. The
Court held that its holding would apply to anyone who "has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way "107 In what was surely one of the least honest sentences in the opinion, the Court stated that "[t]his is what
we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which
0 8
had focused on an accused.'
The cases decided soon after Miranda clarified that "custody"
did not mean "arrest" so that individuals who had not been formally arrested could still be entitled to the protections offered by
the Fifth Amendment. Chief among these cases is Orozco v.
Texas,1° 9 in which the defendant was detained in his own boardinghouse bedroom." 0 Rejecting the argument that the defendant
was in familiar surroundings and so not subjected to the coercive
atmosphere present in Miranda, the Court asked instead whether
the defendant was free to leave."'
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Id. at 444 n.4.
394 U.S. 324 (1969).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326-27.
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All four officers entered the bedroom and began to question petitioner. From the moment he gave his name, according to the
testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was not free to go
where he pleased but was "under arrest."
According to the officer's testimony, petitioner was under
arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. The Miranda opinion
declared that the warnings were required when the person being
interrogated was "in custody at the station or otherwise
de'112
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Orozco establishes that the Fifth Amendment does not demand
that a formal custodial setting be present or that a specific procedure such as an arrest take place. 11 Instead, the question of
whether the defendant's freedom has been unduly limited is determinative. Such a standard may seem somewhat broader than that
found in Miranda itself, in which the Court referred to police custody and the station house setting as being inherently coercive because of the "incommunicado 1 4interrogation of individuals in a po'1
lice-dominated atmosphere.
In fact, the concept has been considerably narrowed in application by use of the usual case-by-case standard to determine
whether custody is present. Two cases are particularly helpful in
demonstrating how this narrowing process has taken place. In Oregon v. Mathason,"15 the interrogation occurred at the police station.11 6 The Court determined the accused was not in custody by
emphasizing that no proof had been offered that "the questioning
took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was

112. Id. at 325, 327 (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 477). In some recent cases, custody has
been found when the defendant was questioned in her own home. The issue is whether the
police actions are inherently coercive. See, e.g., United States v. Levinson, 790 F Supp.
1477, 1481-82 (D. Nev. 1992).
113. But cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-90 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is only applicable upon initiation of an adversarial judicial proceeding
against the accused).
114. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. In support of the position taken in Orozco, see Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), where the defendant was questioned while in prison serving a state sentence. Id. Rejecting the dissents view that Miranda should not apply because
the interrogation occurred "in familiar surroundings," zd. at 7 (White, J., dissenting), the
Court found the suspect to be in custody, albeit for another offense. Id. at 4-5.
115. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
116. Id. at 493-94.
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restricted in any way "117 Though Mathiason was certainly a chief
suspect in the crime and the "focus" of the investigation, he was
not in custody 118
The Supreme Court went one step further with its decision in
Californa v. Beheler 1I" The defendant there, like Mathiason,
"voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the station house, although the police specifically told Beheler that he was not under
arrest."' 20 Unlike Mathiason, however, Beheler was interviewed
just after the crime had been committed, had been drinking earlier
in the day, and was emotionally upset.1 2 ' Moreover, "the police
had a great deal more information about Beheler before their interview than did the police in Mathiason.'' 22 The Court found no
custody because there was no "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal
23
arrest."1
This specific factual type inquiry 24 into custody is most unfortunate. It requires courts in almost all cases not involving formal arrest to consider a host of factors in determining the degree of restraint used by the police. Moreover, for a long time it was not
certain which factors were dispositive. For instance, should the
judge have looked to the state of mind of the suspect to determine

117. Id. at 495.
118. The Court noted that "Mirandawarnings are required only where there has been
such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is
limited." Id.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, sharply differed from the majority's view:
In my view, even if respondent were not in custody, the coercive elements in
the instant case were so pervasive as to require Miranda-type warnings. Respondent was interrogated in "privacy" and in "unfamiliar surroundings," factors on which Miranda places great stress. The investigation had focused on
respondent. And respondent was subjected to some of the "deceptive stratagems," which called forth the Miranda decision.
Id. at 498 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
119. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
120. Id. at 1122.
121. Id. at 1124-25.
122. Id. at 1125.
123. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
124. I refer to this as a specific factual type inquiry because numerous particular questions must be raised concerning states of mind, locations, time, type of surroundings, etc.
Nevertheless, these determinations are to be made by the court as a matter of law.
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117

whether the suspect thought he was free to go, or was the appropriate inquiry made concerning the police officer's intent? That issue is now settled, for unquestionably, the Court uses a reasonable
person standard. 125 Still, one may well ask if the location of the
interrogation is utterly irrelevant, or would it sometimes matter
that the questioning was conducted in a police interrogation room
rather than in the home or office of the suspect?"2 '
To note that the law is not definitive with regard to what constitutes "custody" is to engage in substantial understatement. My
criticism of the current state of the law, however, goes beyond
merely the lack of certainty and reliability I believe that recent
history shows that the courts are engaging in a poor process of
analysis and asking the wrong question. The courts should not be
asking whether, in the given case, the circumstances bear all the

125. In United States v. Marks, 603 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018
(1980), the court explained that it utilized four factors in deciding whether an interrogation
was custodial: (1) probable cause to arrest, (2) the subjective intent of the interrogators to
hold the subject, (3) the subjective belief of the suspect concerning the status of his freedom, and (4) whether the investigation has focused on the suspect. Id. at 584.
Later, however, the same court rejected the Marks analysis and stated that the question
was whether "a reasonable person m the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates
with formal arrest." United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
dented, 488 U.S. 924 (1988). On this point the Supreme Court is crystal clear: "[T]he only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man m the suspect's position would have understood
his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). In United States v. Phillips,
812 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1987), the court held:
[I]n order for a court to conclude that a suspect is m custody, it must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would feel a restraint on ins freedom of movement fairly
characterized as that "degree associated with a formal arrest" to such extent
that he would not feel free to leave.
Id. at 1360. The "totality of circumstances" standard is the prevailing mode of determining
whether custody exists, and depends upon many factors such as nature of the setting, number of officers present, restraint upon the suspect, and type of interrogation. See United
States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Joe, 770 F Supp. 607,
612 (D.N.M. 1991).
126. Compare People v. Fischetti, 264 N.E.2d 191, 193 (I1. 1970) (finding that the defendant was not in custody during an interrogation at his own home because he was in a
very familiar environment and the questioning was not prolonged) with United States v.
Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding the defendant was in custody,
though he was interrogated in the familiar environment of his own home, because he was
not told he could reject a request for an interview, was not informed that he was not under
arrest, and was not told that he could refuse to answer questions).
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indicia of an arrest. It is the wrong question because it is not the
fact of custody which is so necessarily and inherently coercive, as
the Court in Miranda mistakenly determined. No, it is the fact of
interrogatinof a suspect by a law enforcement officer which is so
terribly coercive. The fact of interrogation is the key element.
The Court's concern in Miranda with the arrest-like situation
was far too narrow Consider this language from the opinion emphasizing the station house setting even in relation to other government locations: "[C]ompulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other
official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery "127

Instead, the Court's aside in Mathiason-an aside because the
majority there further narrowed the custody test-is far more pertinent. "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact
that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which
may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime."12
While the Court in Mathiason was wrong to adhere to the rigid
requirement of an arrest-like situation, it was right to call attention to the coercion present whenever one is suspected of a crime
12
and questioned by a police officer. 9

The correct rule, one which would adhere far more closely to the
spirit of Miranda, if not the written words found there, is one
which would require warnings anytime law enforcement officials
interrogate an individual they suspect of a crime. Lest this proposal be dismissed as absolutely unworkable or completely radical in
concept, I hasten to note that this is the precise rule currently in
effect in many investigations conducted by various governmental
agencies. The United States Department of Justice, as a matter of
internal policy, routinely gives to grand jury targets a written "Advice of Rights" form. 13 0 This writing informs the individual of the

127. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
128. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
129. Of course, it could be argued that coercion is present whenever a citizen is confronted by a police officer in virtually any setting, even if the citizen is not yet a suspect. See
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some PreliminaryThoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1991).
130. 7 DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, $ 9-11.150 (1992).
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grand jury function. It advises that person of the right to remain
silent as to any matter that might incriminate him and further informs him of the right to confer with an attorney outside the grand
jury room.131 This warning is not constitutionally required,3 2 but
was established as a matter of policy 133 Similarly, the Internal
Revenue Service instructs its agents on procedures when dealing
with a taxpayer who is not in custody 134 The agent is told to advise the taxpayer of her rights:

131. Id. Attorneys typically are not allowed to appear with clients before the grand jury.
FED. i. CRm P. 6(d).
132. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977); United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 578-81 (1976).
133. Indeed, the Manual directs that the prosecutor should orally restate the warnings on
the record before the grand jury and determine that the witness understands these rights. 7
DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL,

supra note 130; see also United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796,

798 (7th Cir. 1992).
134. Internal Revenue Service, Handbook for Special Agents § 242.132, reprinted in IRVING SCHREIBER & CARMINE SCUDERE, How TO HANDLE TAX AUDIT REQUESTS FOR RULINGS,
FRAUD CASES AND OTHER PROCEDURES BEFORE I.R.S. 8331 (1977). As with the Justice Depart-

ment policy discussed above, the IRS is not constitutionally required to follow this procedure. The Supreme Court, in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), held that the
IRS agents did not need to give warnings in connection with the interrogation of a person
suspected of criminal income tax violations unless the defendant was in custody. Id. at 347.
Although the "focus" of an investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time
of the interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly
found himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its
holding. Miranda specifically defined "focus," for its purposes, as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda,384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
The rationale for the IRS practice was explained in a 1967 news release, set out in United
States v. Brod, 324 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Tex. 1971):
In response to a number of inquiries the Internal Revenue Service today
described its procedures for protecting the Constitutional rights of persons suspected of crimmal tax fraud, during all phases of its investigations.
Investigation of suspected crunmal tax fraud is conducted by Special Agents
of the IRS Intelligence Division. This function differs from the work of Revenue Agents and Tax Technicians who examine returns to determine the correct
tax liability.
Instructions issued to IRS Special Agents go beyond most legal requirements
to assure that persons are advised of their Constitutional rights.
On initial contact with a taxpayer, IRS Special Agents are instructed to produce their credentials and state: "As a special agent, I have the function of
investigating the possibility of criminal tax fraud."
If the potential criminal aspects of the matter are not resolved by preliminary inquiries and further investigation becomes necessary, the Special Agent
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[U]nder the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to
submit any information if such answers or information might
tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything which you say and any documents which you submit may
be used against you in any criminal proceeding which may be
wish, seek
undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if you
135
the assistance of any attorney before responding.
These practices make sense. Any person testifying before a
grand jury, and any taxpayer being interviewed in connection with
a criminal tax investigation will feel tremendous pressure and may
not understand the rights to remain silent and to seek the assistance of counsel. If this principle is correct in these non-custody
more traditional crime situasituations, it is equally correct in13the
6
tion such as in the Beheler case.
In Beheler, the defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting
first-degree murder. 137 Beheler already was viewed by the police as
a suspect in the case, when the questioning took place in the station house, and the interview was designed to produce incriminating responses.138 In the words of the California court, Beheler "was
emotionally distraught.' 3 9 Surely in such a situation, there is an
excellent possibility that the suspect would feel great pressure,
and, like the grand jury witness or the IRS' taxpayer, not under-

is required to advise the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights to remain silent
and to retain counsel.
If it becomes necessary to take a person into custody, Special Agents must
give a comprehensive statement of rights before any interrogation. This statement warns a person in custody that he may remain silent and that anything
he says may be used against him. He is also told that he has the right to consult or have present his own counsel before making a statement or answering
any questions, and that if he cannot afford counsel he can have one appointed
by the U.S. Commissioner.
IRS said although many Special Agents had in the past advised persons, not
in custody, of their privilege to remain silent and retain counsel, the recently
adopted procedures insure uniformity in protecting the Constitutional rights of
all persons.
Id. at 803.
135. SCHREIBER & SCUDERE, supra note 134, at 8331.
136. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
137. Id. at 1122.
138. Id. at 1123.
139. Id. at 1125.
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to remain silent or his right to seek the assistance
stand his right
140
of counsel.
The first effort, then, to recreate a bright line rule for Miranda
begins with the requirement of custody The warnings should be
mandated anytime the police interrogate an individual who is either in custody as traditionally defined, or is suspected by the police of having committed a crime.
2. Interrogatin
Throughout much of this Article the Supreme Court has been
hit with direct-and hopefully telling-criticism, either relating to
the subversion of the policies behind Miranda or the spotty application of the doctrine. Let us turn now, however, to an area in
which the Court has followed faithfully the teachings of Miranda
and applied the doctrine in a reasonable and even-handed fashion."' To be sure, I suggest but one alteration to the Court's definition of the key term "interrogation."
The principal opinion defining and applying the term "interrogation" is Rhode Island v. Innis.1 42 In Innis, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, carefully avoided the two extremes which had
been suggested regarding the Miranda prerequisite of interrogation. At one end of the spectrum is the notion that the interrogation requirement should be viewed in a very limited fashion. Essentially, pursuant to this standard Miranda would be applied
only if the suspect was being questined in a traditional sense. The
Court quickly rejected this view.143 At the other end of the spectrum is the idea that the interrogation requirement should be
140. Cf. id. at 1125-26. Although the Court held that Beheler did not have to be given
warnings, Beheler illustrates how great pressure or strain can operate adversely on an intercontinue occasionally to
rogee. It also demonstrates how "the police and lower courts
have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody." Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984).
141. This is not to say that I would necessarily agree with the ultimate conclusion of the
Court in a given interrogation case. Indeed, the case under discussion here is one with which
I disagree and believe the dissenter's conclusion with regard to interrogation is correct. Nevertheless, the Court's definition is an appropriate one and its resolution one upon which
reasonable minds can differ.
142. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
143. Id. at 301. Language in the dissenting opinion suggests that in fact the Court did not
reject this view. In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart responded sharply to this language:
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in an all-encompassing fashion. That is, if the defendant
statement while in custody, Miranda would apply Relying
on the language and spirit of Miranda, the Court also
rejected this view-

This is not to say, however, that all statements obtained by the
police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation. As the Court in Miranda
noted: "Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence."' 4 4
The Court's ultimate holding is one which fairly reads Miranda
and also provides guidance to law enforcement officials. The question for the courts will be whether the police took actions "that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.' 145 The standard is an objective one
which "focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police." 46 One may well dispute the
application of this doctrine in specific cases, 47 but the key question of what an officer could foresee seems entirely appropriate.

"One of the dissenting opinions seems totally to misapprehend this definition in suggesting
that 'it will almost certainly exclude every statement [of the police] that is not punctuated
with a question mark.'" Id. at 301 n.6.
144. Id. at 299-300 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). Some states go beyond Miranda
in this respect. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 306 N.E.2d 409, 411 n.1 (Ohio 1974) (interpreting
the statutory mandate in Ohio as requiring "that a person arrested or confined be provided
facilities with which to obtain counsel" even if not being interrogated).
145. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. The Court's definition here is quite similar to that found in
the Sixth Amendment area. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-401 (1977), an opinion also authored by Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart struggled, however, in Innis to make
clear that the Sixth Amendment definition, while similar, comes from a case involving far
different jurisprudential considerations because it deals with the right to counsel. Hence,
while the term "interrogation" is the same, the definitions of "interrogation" are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are
quite distinct. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. See generally Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"' When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 41-55
(1978).
146. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
147. I believe Justice Marshall gets the better of the argument concerning the application
of this doctrine in Innis itself. In dissent, Justice Marshall notes that he is "substantially in
agreement with the Court's definition of 'interrogation' within the meaning of Miranda v.
Arizona." Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In Innis, the suspect "was
arrested [in the early morning hours], handcuffed, searched, advised of his rights, and
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I would only take one short step beyond the Court's holding in
Innis. Instead of limiting the test to the objective standard, I
would ask two additional questions. First, did the officers intend to
elicit a response; and second, did the suspect believe she was being
interrogated? In many cases answers to all three questions, the
Court's and mine, will merge so that there will be little difficulty or
difference in application. In some cases, however, where the foreseeablity test is not met, but the officers hoped to elicit a response, 11s or the suspect felt as if she were being interrogated, it is
just to apply the mandate of Miranda. After all, the purpose is to
promote the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. Why not
go beyond the objective standard if the police sought an incriminating statement or the suspect believed she was being questioned? 4 9 Adding this step will insure that the suspect's resulting

placed in the back seat of a patrol car." Id. The two officers m the front seat began to talk
about the search for a missing gun. The majority characterized these statements as " 'no
more than a few off-hand remarks' which could not reasonably have been expected to elicit
a response." Yd. at 306. Justice Marshall disagreed:
[The police officer's statements] would obviously have constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent, and the result should
not be different because they were nominally addressed to [the other officer].
This is not a case where police officers speaking among themselves are accidentally overheard by a suspect. These officers were "talking back and forth" in
close quarters with the handcuffed suspect, traveling past the very place where
they believed the weapon was located. They knew respondent would hear and
attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with knowledge of and
responsibility for the pressures to speak which they created.
Id. at 306-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. In Innis, Justice Marshall argued that the police were not engaged in idle chatter
which happened to result m an incriminating statement by the suspect. See id. The trial
judge, however, thought that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers] would voice
their concern [for the safety of the handicapped children] to each other." Id. at 303 n.9.
149. There will likely be few cases m which a police officer sought a statement or a suspect believed that she was being questioned which would not also satisfy the Court's foreseeability test. The majority in Innis was correct in noting:
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have
a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions
were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where
a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police
should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect.
Id. at 301-02 n.7. Of course, suspects might routinely indicate they believed they were being
interrogated. Unless one of the other two standards is met, however, it will be the unusual
case in which the requirement of interrogation will be met.
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statement is voluntary, which is the basis for the Court's holding in
Innis.150
3.

The Warnings

Justice Harlan, dissenting in Miranda, complained vigorously
about what he called the new "code" for law enforcement created
by the majority 151 In terms of what preceded Miranda,152 Justice
Harlan had a point. The Court's decision was awfully specific, particularly with regard to the four warnings that had to be given to
suspects in custody prior to their interrogation. 53 The defendant
had to be told: (1) "in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the
right to remain silent;" 1 5 4 (2) "[the first warning] must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court; ' 155 (3) "[the suspect] must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation;" r5 and (4) "if he
is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 1 57 In light
of this specificity, one would have thought that at least this part of
the "bright line" rule-the warnings-would have survived into
the 1990's without requiring further factual inquiries on a case-bycase basis. That hardly has been the case.
The problems arise because some law enforcement officers, although having concluded that they will follow Miranda, decide to
become creative. They give warnings, but these warnings deviate
from those set out above.15 One might well ask why any sane mdi150. Justice Stevens, in his separate dissent, takes a slightly different view of the mterrogation standard than I do. He contends that the definition "must include any police statement or conduct that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question." Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516-17 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152. The traditional approach applied the voluntarness test on a case-by-case basis. See
supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
153. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.
154. Id. at 467-68.
155. Id. at 469.
156. Id. at 471.
157. Id. at 473.
158. E.g., Duckworth v. Eagon, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (regarding form presented to defendant, stating that a lawyer would be appointed "if and when you go to court"); California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (failing to state explicitly that defendant had the right to an
attorney before further questioning).
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vidual, having made the decision to give warnings, would not adhere to the language of Miranda.If the officers give the "standard"
59
warnings, the law enforcement position is helped enormously 1 It

will be extremely difficult to show later that Miranda was violated.160 The complaint over the past two decades from the law enforcement community, though, has been that the rules of law relating to police work are too confusing, too uncertain. As stated quite
graphically by one experienced officer: "It's like the Supreme
speak German, and we're the
Court speaks French, the legislatures
161
only ones speaking English.

In Miranda, the Chief Justice spoke English; why then don't
some police officers respond to that specific language? It is, of
course, impossible to determine why some officers choose to give
their own version of the warnings. For some it may be a negative
reaction to anything which comes from the Supreme Court, even
something as helpful to them as the Miranda warnings. For others
it may simply be a mistake in the heat of the moment. Whatever
the reason, deviations do occur. Most importantly, however, the
police generally do respond by giving the warnings, virtually verbatim. In only a relatively few cases do the officers stray from the
language of the Court. When they do, however, the resulting problem is severe.
159. With respect to the impact on individual suspects, however, it is far from certain
whether the Miranda warnings provide great assistance. One police officer is quoted by Professor Uviller as stating "[tihe Miranda warnings do not make a particle of difference.
It's just plain silly. In the first place, nobody we're interested in talking to believes a word
we tell them. Whether it's for their own good or not." UvILLER, supra note 6, at 208. Professor Ogletree, with a very different experience, agrees with this analysis:
Although Miranda warnings may seem adequate from the detached perspective of a trial or appellate courtroom, in the harsh reality of a police interrogation room, they are woefully ineffective. My own experience as a public defender has been that many suspects make statements during the process of
police interrogation and are surprised to learn thereafter that they had a constitutional right to remain silent or have an attorney present during questioning. This pattern suggests that Miranda warnings as currently delivered by the
police are not an effective means of informing suspects both of the existence
and extent of their privilege against self-incrimination and of their right to
consult with counsel before they make any statements.
Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1827-28.
160. This applies except in the cases in which the waiver issue is raised. See infra notes
215-48 and accompanying text.
161. Wermiel, supra note 12, at 14.
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Two Supreme Court cases demonstrate the problem. Califorma
v. Prysock, 6 2 involved a horrible murder in which the defendant

was the major suspect.16 While in custody the suspect was given
warnings,a 4 but "was not explicitly informed of his right to have
an attorney appointed before further questioning." 6 5 The lower
courts found a Miranda violation and emphasized to the police the
ease with which the mandate of the Supreme Court could be satisfied." While recognizing the virtue of Miranda's warnings as
"obviat[ing] the need for a case-by-case inquiry,

' 16 7

a majority of

the Supreme Court ruled that the exact words of the warnings
from the opinion did not have to be used."6 Moreover, the Court
chastised the California judges for their "rigidity"This Court has never indicated that the "rigidity" of Miranda
extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.
This Court and others have stressed as one
virtue of Miranda the fact that the giving of the warnings obviates the need for a case-by-case inquiry into the actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused.
Nothing in these
observations suggests any desirable rigidity in the form of the
required warnings.
Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures. The
Court in that case stated that "[t]he warnings required and the
waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

453 U.S. 355 (1981).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 359.
Id.
[T]he Court of Appeal ruled that these warnings were inadequate because respondent was not explicitly informed of his right to have an attorney appointed before further questioning. The Court of Appeal stated that "[o]ne of
[Miranda's]virtues is its precise requirements which are so easily met
[.]
'[Tihe rigidity of the Miranda rules and the way in which they are to be applied was conceived of and continues to be recognized as the decision's greatest
strength.'"
Id. at 358-59 (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting App. A to
Pet. for Cert. at 12, Prysock (No. 80-1846)).
167. Id. at 359.
168. Id.
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the absence of a fully effective equwalent, prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant."169

The majority considered the correct procedure to be a case-by-case
factual inquiry in which the judge examines the warnings given to
the suspect to determine if "the reference to appointed counsel
was linked to a future point in time after the- police interrogation. ' 170 Under that inquiry, no constitutional violation was found
in Prysock.Y
The Court used a similar inquiry in Duckworth v. Eagan.7 2 In
Duckworth, the police merely informed the suspect that a lawyer
would be appointed "if and when you go to court.'

7

Chief Justice

Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that the question
169. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
170. Id. at 360. For a recent application of the doctrine, see Oregon v. Quinn, 831 P.2d 48
(Or. Ct. App. 1992), in which the officer did not advise the suspect that he was entitled to
consult with an attorney before questioning and to have counsel present during questioning.
Id. at 51. The officer only said, "You have the right to an attorney." Id. at 50. The court
found that the officer's statement, in light of Prysock, satisfied Miranda.Id. at 51, 53. "That
advice apprised'defendant that he had the right to counsel, right then. It could not mislead
him into believing that he would have the right to counsel at some future time, nor did it
suggest that defendant's right to counsel was conditioned upon any event." Id. at 52.
171. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 362. Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with the Court's conclusion, relying heavily on the California court's analysis of the warnings and the factual setting for them. Id. at 362-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The state court had emphasized that
the key element missing was that the defendant, a minor, " 'was not given the crucial information that the services of the free attorney were available prior to the impending questioning.'" Id. at 363 (quoting App. A to Pet. for Cert. at 15, Prysock (No. 80-1846)). Justice
Stevens concluded that, at a nummnum, the record in the case was "sufficiently ambiguous"
and that the Court itself "[was] guilty of attaching greater importance to the form of the
Miranda ritual than to the substance of the message it [was] intended to convey." Id. at
366.
172. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
173. Id. at 198. The police read the defendant the following set of warnings:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court.
You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the
advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have
no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish,
if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a
lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time.
You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a
lawyer.
Id. at 198 (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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"issimply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.',1'74 The Court found that
the essential message was conveyed. 7 5 The difficulty with the
Court's conclusion is that an accused, while being interrogated at
the police station may think that he will not receive a lawyer "until
some indeterminate time in the future after questioning.'' 17 Indeed, it appears quite likely that the "often frightened suspect[]
unlettered in the law"' 7 7 hearing the key "modifying" language
might well think he will get a lawyer only when he actually goes to
court, not when he is at the police station house. Miranda surely
1 8
requires more than that. 7
The thrust of the Court's decisions in these cases is hard to
grasp. If the point of Miranda is to convey to suspects their rights
to the assistance of counsel and to silence, why not require the police to follow the warnings as given in the decision? Tell the suspect he can keep quiet, his words will be used against him, and
explain "in a straightforward fashion that he has the right to the
presence of a lawyer before and during questioning, and that a law'79
yer will be appointed if he cannot afford one.'
To be sure, perhaps the most important feature of Miranda is
the ease with which the police can satisfy the warnings requirement just by reading the precise warnings stated in the opinion.
The Court in Prysock decided "no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.' ' 80 I think the Court was wrong. It
is not inappropriate to require an "incantation," to order that the
four warnings of Miranda be given in language that is certain and
not modified by phrases that have the potential for confusion.
Moreover, placing the lower courts on the road to deciphering the
impact and discerning the meaning of vague phrases and evaluating the reaction of schooled and unschooled defendants both dis-

174. Id. at 203 (alteration in original) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 214 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 216.
178. "The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that
would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473
(1966).
179. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 220 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359.
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courages police compliance with the mandate of Miranda1s l and
creates a fruitless process of fact specific inquiries about the sufficiency of the substitute warnings themselves.
The Court should reject this approach and hold that the Miranda warnings, not some reasonable facsimile, are required. No
deviation from Miranda should be allowed unless the government
clearly can demonstrate that the deviation would not lead to confusion regarding the required warnings, a difficult burden to sustain and certainly one that the government could not have sustained in either Prysock or Duckworth.
4.

The Resumptin of Questining

We come now to the one area that, perhaps more than any other,
best typifies the problems that have arisen when attempting to
soften the "rigid" Miranda rule. I refer here- to the situation in
which the defendant initially chooses not to respond to the mterrogation but later incrimiates himself after the police officers have
1 2
resumed the interrogation.
181. The result is a case such as United States v. Tilhnan, 963 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1992). In
that case the officer advised the defendant of all hns rights except that anything the defendant said could be used against him in court. Id. at 141. The court recognized Duckworth v.
Eagan, but distinguished it, finding that in Tillman, the police officer's failure was "a much
more troublesome deviation from the traditional warnings." Id.
Of all of the elements provided for in Miranda, this element is perhaps the
most critical because it lies at the heart of the need to protect a citizen's Fifth
Amendment rights. The underlying rationale for the Miranda warnings is to
protect people from being coerced or forced into making self-incriminating
statements by the government. By omitting this essential element from the
Miranda warnings a person may not realize why the right to remain silent is so
critical.
Id. In apparent exasperation, the court in Tillman went on to suggest that government officers read from a prepared card, "as this reduces the chances for error, assists a police
officer in the performance of Ins duties, and protects the rights of innocent citizens as well
as those accused." Id. at 141-42.
182. The problem here does not involve the situation in which the defendant himself
chooses to resume the interrogation process, which is always permissible. Of course, it can
be very difficult in a given case to determine whether the defendant actually resumed the
interrogation process, or simply began a somewhat casual conversation. See, for instance,
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), in which after first choosing not to speak, the
suspect asked the police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now ' " Id. at 1042.
Four members of the Court found that the suspect's question constituted an initiation or
resumption of the interrogation process. Id. at 1046. Four other Justices disagreed because
the defendant did not offer to discuss the actual criminal investigation. Id. at 1053 (Mar-
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The Supreme Court has identified two situations that can arise
in connection with the resumption of questioning. The first occurs

when the defendant indicates that he wishes to remain silent. The
second occurs when the defendant states that he wishes to speak
with counsel before responding to questions. The Court has held
that the appropriate rules as to the resumption of questioning in
these two situations are quite different, as mandated by
s
Miranda.""
In Michigan v. Mosley,8 the defendant was arrested, given the
Miranda warnings, and then asked questions concerning a series of
robberies. 88 He told the officer that he did not want to answer any
questions about the robberies. 8 At that point, the interrogation
stopped.18 7 A few hours later a different officer restated the warn-

ings and asked the defendant questions regarding a homicide. s
The defendant consequently confessed to the killing.' The defendant took the position that his confession should have been
suppressed because, under Miranda, once the defendant asks to
remain silent, all questioning must cease. 90 The Court recognized
that language in Miranda lent support to the notion that the government can never resume questioning:
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody inshall, J., dissenting). The deciding vote belonged to Justice Powell, who thought that the
important question was not who resumed the interrogation process, but rather whether the
suspect had voluntarily spoken. Id. at 1049 (Powell, J., concurring).
183. As indicated below, while the Court places great significance in the difference between the two requests, it is very unlikely that many defendants can or do see that significance. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
184. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
185. Id. at 97.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 97-98.
189. Id. at 96.
190. Id. at 100.
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terrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in
producing a statement after the privilege has been once
invoked." 191
The majority rejected any "literal" interpretation of this passage, 2 believing that such literalism "would lead to absurd and
unintended results." 193 Instead, the Court found that Miranda required a focus on whether m a particular case the defendant's
"'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' ",9e
Under the circumstances present in the instant case, Justice Stewart concluded that this right had been so honored. 195 In particular,
the Court identified four key factors supporting its conclusion present m the case: (1) the police officers immediately stopped the
interrogation in response to the defendant's request; (2) they resumed the interrogation "only after the passage of a significant period of time;" (3) the defendant was given a fresh set of warnings
prior to the resumption of questioning; and (4) the second interro-

191. Id. at 100-01 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
192. Id. at 103.
193. Id. at 101.
The passage could be literally read to mean that a person who has invoked his
"right to silence" can never again be subjected to custodial interrogation by
any police officer at any time or place on any subject. Another possible construction of the passage would characterize "any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege" as "the product of compulsion" and would therefore
mandate its exclusion from evidence, even if it were volunteered by the person
in custody without any further interrogation whatever. Or the passage could be.
interpreted to require only the immediate cessation of questioning, and to permit a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite.
It is evident that any of these possible literal interpretations would lead to
absurd and unintended results. To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of
Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of
the person being questioned. At the other extreme, a blanket prohibition
against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Mirandasafeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and
intelligent assessments of their interests.
Id. at 101-02.
194. Id. at 104.
195. Id. at 107.
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gation related to a crime that had not been covered in the earlier
interrogation."'6
19 7
The Court reached a different result in Edwards v. Arizona.
The Edwards opinion was written by Justice White who in Mosley
had dissented in part.198 In Edwards, White joined the Justices
who had voted with the majority in Mosley because all members of
the Court viewed this case as being quite different from Mosley 198
Mosley asked to remain silent in response to custodial interrogation. 20 0 Edwards asked to see his lawyer in response to custodial
interrogation.20 1 This difference in requests is one of fundamental
constitutional significance because once the defendant asks for an
attorney, " 'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' -1202 The language of the Court is very strong:
[A]lthough
the accused may himself validly waive his rights
and respond to interrogation,
the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused
asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We
further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
196.
197.
198.
ing to

Id. at 106.
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Justice White actually concurred in Mosley, but dissented from the reasoning relatthe significant break in time:
The majority seems to say that a statement obtained within some unspecified
time after an assertion by an individual of his "right to silence" is always inadmissible, even if it was the result of an informed and voluntary decision-following, for example, a disclosure to such an individual of a piece of
information bearing on his waiver decision, which the police had failed to give
him prior to his assertion of the privilege, but which they gave him unmediately thereafter. Indeed, the majority characterizes as "absurd" any contrary
rule.
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 107 (White, J., concurring).
199. On this point, the Court was unanimous. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist concurring in the result in Edwards, differed with the majority on various
other aspects of the opinion. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
200. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
201. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479.
202. Id. at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
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subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to hun, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police.
Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to
counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the
accused, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present."20 3
The Court's resolution of the issue in Edwards is correct. When
the defendant asks to see a lawyer, only a meeting with the lawyer
will adequately respond to that request. The Court's decision in
Mosley, however, is highly problematic for at least two reasons.
The first is the tremendous importance that the Court attaches to
the wording of the request made by Mosley as compared to the one
made by Edwards. It is not at all clear that the suspect understands the difference between saying "I don't want to talk," and
saying "I don't want to talk until I see my lawyer." Certainly the
research supports the conclusion that the suspect may well be
frightened or confused and is saying anything just to have the police stop questioning him.20 '
Even if the suspect does understand the difference between the
phrases, one properly can question why that fact should be of constitutional significance. If the suspect says that he does not wish to
talk, would it lead to "absurd and unintended" results to require
the police to terminate the interrogation process and not resume it
until the suspect either has a lawyer or initiates the process himself? Not at all, or at least the result would be no more absurd and
unintended than that found in Edwards where the suspect asked

203. Id. at 484-85 (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
204. See, e.g., UVILxR, supra note 6, at 195-97; Ogletree, supra note 2, at 1827-29.
Though coming to this result from very different experiences and backgrounds, Professors
Ogletree and Uviller both cast serious doubt on the impact of the warnings and the degree
of understanding by suspects undergoing custodial interrogation. Some recent cases raise
the same issue. In one case, Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992), the suspect
asked, "Didn't you tell me I had the right to an attorney9 " Id. at 1410. The court held that
this was not an invocation of the right to a lawyer under Miranda.Id. at 1412. In contrast,
see United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1992), in which the court
found that the following statement constituted a request for an attorney "I don't know if I
need a lawyer, maybe I should have one, but I don't know if it would do me any good at this
point." Id. at 1472.
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to see a lawyer. As a matter of policy, the process suggested in
Miranda makes a good deal of sense in terms of preserving the
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. If the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation should not
be resumed.
The second reason Mosley is problematic is because it is the
most narrow and fact specific decision in this area since Escobedo,2 05 offering virtually no guidance to anyone in the criminal
justice system. The Court looked to the particular circumstances
present in the interrogation of Mosley and concluded that under
the circumstances no Fifth Amendment violation had occurred. 0 6
If each of the four factors indicated above must be shown, 07 the
case has almost no value as precedent or as a model for law enforcement. There will be few cases in which the police immediately
stop interrogation, wait a significant period of time, give fresh Miranda warnings, and then ask questions about a crime unrelated to
the subject of the first interrogation. Surely such cases occur, but it
is difficult to imagine that they occur very often.
If each of the four factors need not be present, as some have
suggested, then Mosley could have some real value. 208 Unfortunately, the Court has never revealed the significance of these factors, for it has not dealt with this subject since Mosley 209 More-

205. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
206. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 107.
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., People v. Stander, 251 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). In Stander, the
court applied the Mosley doctrine and made the following proposition: "It is now the law
that where a person in custody expresses his desire to cut off questioning, a police officer is
not prohibited from resuming interrogation 'after the passage of a significant period of time
and the provision of a fresh set of warnings.'" Id. at 263 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 10607). Glaringly absent from the court's statement is any reference to the second interrogation
being restricted to a crime which had not been the subject of the first interrogation. For
additional cases not requiring the presence of all four of the Mosley factors, see United
States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir. 1991); Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1131
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Groome v. Keeney, 826 F.2d 883, 886 (9th
Cir. 1987). But for cases that require adherence to all four factors, see Nelson v. Fulcomer,
911 F.2d 928, 940 (3d Cir. 1990); Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021 (2d Cir. 1989);
Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077
(1988).
209. The Supreme Court has decided several cases that deal with the issue of resuming
questioning. These cases, however, deal with somewhat collateral questions and do not go to
the heart of the resumption issue. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990)
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135

over, the definitional problems created by the Court in Mosley are
enormous. In Mosley, the Court wrote of the "passage of a significant period of time" between the first interrogation and the second
which under the facts constituted a few hours. 10 Could it be a few
minutes? Obviously, it could not be "a momentary cessation,"211
but how is the officer to know the difference between momentary
and significant? Two or three hours is fine, but what about fifteen
to twenty minutes, or one hour9 Also, the Court focused on the
fact that the subsequent questioning regarded a crime that "had
not been the subject of the earlier interrogation.

' 212

Let us suppose

that the same officer asks questions at the later interrogation about
a second crime. This was a crime that was in the officer's mind all
along, but she delayed asking questions as a matter of interrogation strategy Would this situation violate Mosley 9 Or, what would
happen if the second interrogation is handled by a different officer,
but the crime is closely 21related
to the crime which was the basis of
3
the first Interrogation?
One could conjure up many other fact situations exploring the
severe problems Mosley creates by rejecting a bright line rule such
as the one adopted in Edwards.214 For this reason, and for considerations of policy and practical import, the Court should follow the
Edwards rule for cases in which either of the two types of requests
is made by the suspect. If the suspect is in police custody and is
interrogated, all questioning must cease, and cannot be resumed, if
the suspect makes a request either to see an attorney or to remain
silent.
(holding that the protections m Edwards were "not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel" when after speaking with his lawyer, the defendant was questioned again
by the police); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (barring the use of a statement that
had been given after a break in time, even though the questioning was by a different police
officer about a different crime, because the defendant indicated that he wished to speak
with counsel before being interrogated).
210. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106.
211. Id. at 102.
212. Id.
213. To be sure, Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued strongly that the first crime covered
in Mosley was closely related to the second crime. The anonymous tip received by the police
officers, which was the sole basis for the arrest, "embraced both the robberies covered m
[the first interrogation] and the robbery-murder [covered in the second]." Id. at 118-19
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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Wawer

In every constitutional context the issue surrounding the waiver
of rights has involved, by definition, a weighing of all material factors, that is, a review of the "totality of the circumstances." 1 ' In
this context, the question is whether "the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel. ' 216 Without a doubt, a
trial judge must evaluate many factors in determining what the defendant knew, what she said, what she meant, and whether the
statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and freely A review of two major Supreme Court decisions in this area demonstrates how difficult this determination can be.
In Connecticut v. Barrett,217 police arrested the defendant and
gave him the Miranda warnings. The defendant stated that " 'he
would not give the police any written statement [without his lawyer being present] but he had no problem in talking about the incident.' ",218 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that these facts
were insufficient to show waiver and further determined that the
defendant's demand that his statement not be in writing "was a
clear request for the assistance of counsel

'29

and was "constitu-

tionally effective despite the defendant's willingness to make oral
statements.

'122

Based on the trial court's finding that the defend-

ant was not "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into speaking,221 the
United States Supreme Court found the waiver valid.222 The question is a difficult one. As the Supreme Court found, the defendant
did indicate a clear willingness to talk with the police, although he
chose not to commit anything to writing.223 Still, one can understand the state judges' lingering belief that the defendant's request
215. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
216. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
217. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
218. Id. at 525 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 12A).
219. Id. at 527 (quoting State v. Barrett, 495 A.2d 1044, 1049 (Conn. 1985)).
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
222. Id. The problems concerning valid waiver continue. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 605
A.2d 1097 (N.J. 1992) (holding that the defendant's oral statement was a knowing, mtelligent and voluntary waiver despite defendant's contention that he did not believe the statements could be used against him at trial).
223. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529-30.
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for a lawyer indicated that he was fearful as to the consequences of
his actions and wanted a lawyer with him.
Fare v. Michael C. 224 is another difficult waiver case. After police
read Miranda warnings to the defendant, a minor, he asked to
have his probation officer with him during the questioning. 225 The
Court did not find that the defendant's request for his probation
officer was an indication of a lack of a waiver.2 26 Instead, relying on
the traditional totality of circumstances approach, the Court found
a valid waiver because the defendant was able to understand his
actions and acted in a voluntary fashion.227 In separate dissenting
opinions, Justice Marshall asserted that the defendant's request
for the probation officer "signal[ed] a desire to remain silent until
contact with the officer [was] made, '22 ' and Justice Powell concluded that under the particular circumstances present, no valid
waiver could be found: "In the absence of counsel, and having refused to call the probation officer, [the police] nevertheless engaged in protracted interrogation.

' 22

The dissenters' point is a

valid one; the defendant did ask for assistance in response to the
interrogation. Yet the majority view is also legitimate; the defendant received his warnings
in specific terms and finally said, "Yeah I
2' 30
want to talk to you.

The waiver issue is difficult under the best of circumstances. The
Supreme Court, however, by rejecting the express waiver requirement, made the matter far more difficult than necessary in a number of close cases. The Court took this step in North Carolina v.
Butler2 1 The North Carolina Supreme Court had fashioned a
rigid rule in Miranda waiver cases: no statement made by a suspect in custody would be allowed into evidence "unless, at the time
the statement was made, he explicitly waived the right to the pres224. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
225. Id. at 710-11.
226. Id. at 719-24. The Califorma court found that the request for the probation officer
constituted an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights, a "per se invocation of Fifth Amendment rights in the same way the request for an attorney was found in Miranda to be, regardless of what the interrogation otherwise might reveal." Id. at 714-15.

227. Id. at 726.
228. Id. at 732 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 734 (Powell, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 711 (quoting In re Michael C., 579 P.2d 7, 8 (Cal. 1978)).
231. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
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ence of a lawyer. ' 23 2 The debate in Butler concerned the requirement that the defendant waive his right to counsel explicitly Butler, in response to custodial interrogation, refused to sign a waiver
on the Miranda form which police had read to him and stated, "I
will talk to you but I am not signing any form. 23 3 He then made
incriminating statements. 3 4
The state court refused to consider the totality of circumstances
on the waiver question, holding that without the signed waiver, or
a specific oral waiver, no statement in response to custodial interrogation could be admitted into evidence. 23 5 The Supreme Court
rejected the requirement of an explicit waiver, concluding that
such a requirement would be both overinclusive and undermclusive. 23 6 The Court believed it would be overinclusive because it
would cover statements by a defendant who made an explicit
waiver involuntarily 2 37 The explicit waiver requirement would be
underinclusive because it would not cover statements by a defendant who did not make an explicit waiver, but whose words and actions indicated waiver.2 3 8
The Court in Butler undoubtedly was correct in its belief that
the express waiver requirement would not solve all of the problems
in the waiver area. Its belief that the requirement would not solve
a great many other problems, however, was incorrect. As Justice
Brennan argued in his dissent, the express waiver requirement
would have worked well in Butler.23 9 The defendant's actions and

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
Id.
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372-73.
See id. at 372.
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or
of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but
is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question
is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.

Id.
238. See id. at 373. "The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights;
the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred
from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id.
239. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The instant case presents a clear example of
the need for an express waiver requirement.").
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words did not clearly show whether he fully understood his rights
and the consequences of talking without signing the waiver form.
"[T]here is no reason to believe that his oral statements, which
followed a refusal to sign a written waiver form, were intended to
signify relinquishment of his rights.

' 24 0

An express waiver require-

ment might have clarified the situation.
241
Miranda requires some showing of waiver by the prosecution;
the court will not presume a waiver merely from the fact that the
defendant responded to the interrogation by making incriminating
statements. 242 An explicit waiver requirement would force suspects
such as Butler to be clear and specific as to whether they understood their rights and chose voluntarily to speak. Obviously the
suspect can meet this requirement in different ways. The suspect
can sign a waiver form2 43 or she can state in certain terms that she
understands her rights and agrees to speak. This oral relinquishment may demonstrate her waiver, whether the statement is simply witnessed by the interrogating officer, or witnessed by someone
else either live or on tape.
The burden on the government to show a knowing and voluntary
waiver in Miranda cases 244 is "great" 24 5 and "heavy ,,246 The impo240. Id.
241. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
242. In Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980), the Supreme Court of Louisiana found
that when an arresting officer notifies a person of insMiranda rights, he does not have to

determine if the suspect understands the rights. Specifically, the court determined that "absent a clear and readily apparent lack [of understanding], it can be presumed that a person
has capacity to understand, and the burden is on the one claiming a lack of capacity to show
that lack." Id. at 470. The Supreme Court summarily reversed, relying on Butler for the
proposition that "[tihe courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the
prosecution's burden is great." Id. at 471 (citing Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).
243. The validity of this option depends on whether in fact the defendant can read and

understand the written warnings, a point which was much disputed in Butler. See Butler,
441 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. The burden is great in other types of waiver cases as well. For a treatment quite
similar to that found in the Miranda cases, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In
Brewer, the Court considered the waiver issue in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and determined the proper standard to be applied:
[I]t [is] incumbent upon the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or
That statement has been
abandonment of a known right or privilege."
reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not deand that courts indulge in every
pend upon a request by the defendant,
This strict standard applies
reasonable presumption against waiver.
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sition of the express waiver requirement would go a long way in
many, though not all, cases to insure that the burden is "rightly on
[the] shoulders ' 247 of the government to prove a free relinquish-

ment of rights, 248 not on the defendant to disprove it in a battle of
assertions with interrogating officers.
V

BACK TO A BRIGHT

LINE RULE

The principles which have evolved over the past half-century regarding incriminating statements and police interrogation are not
of a mere technical nature, designed to obfuscate or complicate
that which is inherently simple.2 49 The principles in this area support one of the most cherished rights in the American criminal justice system, the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Marshall stated the matter well:
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled self-incrimination.
As the Court has explained on numerous occasions, this prohibition is the mainstay of our adversarial system of criminal justice.
Not only does it protect us against the inherent unreliability of
equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a
critical stage of pre-trial proceedings.
Id. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
245. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
246. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (1966).
247. Id.
248. Id. Guidance for law enforcement officials is critical in these cases. In United States
v. Giles, 967 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1992), the defendant asked when he would have an opportunity to talk to an attorney. Id. at 384. The police did not view this question as an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. He was then given his Miranda warnings, said nothing
further about seeing a lawyer, and confessed. See id. at 385-86. The court suppressed the
confession, finding no waiver. Id. at 386. "Although Mr. Giles did not expressly request an
attorney, this statement (his question) could be reasonably construed to be such a request."
Id. Surely, an express waiver requirement in this case would have resulted in an admissible
confession or compliance with the right to counsel. The result in Giles was the worst of all
possibilities.
249. Alas, the reaction among some law enforcement officers to the Miranda requirement
is negative, and strongly so. Professor Uviller quotes one angry officer:
Look, if they want us to give them their rights, we'll do it. It doesn't bother
me to say the words. I just don't like to see the perp walk because some cop
forgot part of it, or because some judge doesn't believe the cop when he testifies that he read the magic words before the questioning began. If you want my
candid opinion, I think Miranda is just another way for the courts to throw out
perfectly good cases.
UVILLER, supra note 6, at 209.
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compelled testimony, but it also ensures that criminal investigations will be conducted with integrity and that the judiciary will
2 50
avoid the taint of official lawlessness.

The rule established in the Miranda decision provides "'practical reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment right. ' 251 It was
designed "to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. '2 52 The process of police interrogation triggers concern that the suspect understands her rights and feels at
ease in exercising those rights.253 Without the Miranda rule, serious doubts would exist as to both the willingness of law enforcement officials to establish protections,2 54 and the suspect's ability
to invoke constitutional protection.2 5 5
Not only are the broad constitutional protection offered by the
privilege against self-incrimination and the policy rationale of Miranda vital to individual rights, but the rule of Miranda itself is
vital. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted, Miranda consolidated
four cases in order "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. 2 56 To be sure, this
hardly is the only area of the law in which lawyers seek clarity and

250. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 687 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For an excellent discussion of the origins and impact of the Fifth Amendment in the Miranda area,
see United States v. Kilgroe, 959 F.2d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1992).
251. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654.
252. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
253. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 461 ("[T]he compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of
the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.").
254. This view is captured in Uviller's book which discusses current police practices in
response to judicial declarations:
A second argument in support of limiting police access to a suspect for purposes of interrogation is best stated in an aphorism by Sir James Fitzjames
Stephens who, speaking of the investigative practices of Indian police, commented that they would much prefer to sit in the shade rubbing pepper in
some poor devil's eyes than to go mucking about in the hot sun looking for
evidence.
UVILLER, supra note 6, at 194.
255. Certainly the troubled experience with the case-by-case voluntariness standard offers
very limited hope that the Due Process Clause would fill the void. See supra notes 16-36
and accompanying text.
256. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
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guidance.257 Undoubtedly, a strict rule, in some criminal cases, will

257. Few areas of the law remain in which lawyers have not anxiously sought bright line
rules. The list of such rules would be lengthy, ranging from corporate "safe-harbor" rules to
IRS regulations to bankruptcy principles. Walter Olson states this point well in his controversial book, The Litigation Explosion (with thanks to my colleague Trotter Hardy):
For a very long time the law in this country, and in England before that,
showed an overwhelming preference for fixed rules over fuzzy standards at almost every opportunity. Some of these rules have survived more or less intact
to our own day. Take the idea of an age of majority. When is someone old
enough to get married, or sign a binding contract, or order a drink in a bar? If
the answer depends on maturity, it will always be in dispute; some of us are
ready for independence at fourteen, others lamentably unready at forty. If the
law were fully alive to human realities, it would entertain much litigation on
this subject. Instead it plays dead, and promulgates a no-thinking-reqwred
rule-count the birthdays-lest it cast perennial suspense over the eligibility
of a million bachelors, the validity of a million credit cards, and the retention
of a million liquor licenses.
How should we behave on the highway' Presumably we owe our fellow motorists some general duty not to endanger them unreasonably. Fortunately,
most accidents are handled under rules of the road that are much more cut
and dried than that. One familiar rule holds that if you bump into the driver
ahead of you, you pay for the damage, even if he slammed on his brakes for no
obvious reason. If courts tried to work out responsibility on a case-by-case basis they'd find it hard to distinguish the occasional innocent rear-car driver
from all the tailgaters who'd be clamoring to be let off for the damage they had
done. Many more full-blown trials would be held, yet injustice would hardly be
avoided. And the simple rule of thumb provides a generally sound maxim for
driving: pay more attention to the car m front of you than to the car behind.
As a group, drivers benefit.
Why rely on breathalyzer tests to define drunk driving, when some drivers
who flunk are less of a menace on the road than others who pass? For that
matter, why ban drunk driving as such at all, when what we want to ban is
incompetent driving by anyone, drunk or sober? Again, one reason is that we
distrust subjectivity on both sides; if every case pits the policeman's bare word
against the driver's, there will be much strife but by no means a perfect winnowing of innocent from guilty. So we give the officer a device we hope is simple to use and the motorist a rule we hope is simple to follow (one-drink-anhour, or whatever).
When does a binding contract come into existence when you are negotiating
by mail? In principle, perhaps, when there's a "meeting of the minds." But
minds are annoyingly inscrutable. It might seem the minds meet when you
resolve to accept the offer, or later when the other guy opens and reads your
letter of acceptance. The problem is that afterward you alone know exactly
when you made up your mind and he alone knows when he opened the envelope. Relying on either trigger would leave too much room for mistakes or fibs
in comparing stories afterward. Hence the law's "mailbox rule," which provides
a fairly objective trigger: you're both locked in when you drop your letter of
acceptance into a mailbox.
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lead to seemingly unjust results. Genuinely guilty individuals will
avoid conviction because the court will suppress their otherwise reliable confessions. Evidence indicating that such a result is rare
mutes this concern.25 8 Moreover, this "cost to the truth seeking
process of evidentiary exclusion invariably is perceived more tangiprivacy values
bly in discrete prosecutions than is the protection2 of
59
through deterrence of future police misconduct.
Over the past twenty years, the key problem with Miranda and
the interrogation process has not been the Miranda rule itself. As
former Chief Justice Burger wrote, "[t]he meaning of Miranda has
become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have ad",260 The problem is that the Supreme
justed to its strictures..
Court, in an effort to aid law enforcement, has attempted to make
less "rigid" what was formerly a concrete and readily understandable rule. Today we are left with a broad principle, but one which
requires very particularized factual inquiries in application.
We should return to the "bright line" rule of Miranda,recognizing that it is the bright line nature of the rule which makes it work
reasonably well-but not perfectly-for all participants in the
criminal justice system, espepially law enforcement officials. In the
broadest sense, Justice Harlan dissenting in Miranda may have
been right, contending that a constitutional "code" of law enforcement conduct is not ideal.28 1 In practical terms, though, a "code" is
far better than our current system which requires all participants
to make predictions based upon shifting case patterns.
The rule I suggest is simple. It provides guidance and direction.
It is faithful to the values enunciated in Miranda for it is a bright

WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 138-40 (1991).

1

258. See Jacoby, supra note 91, at 53 (observing that less than one or two percent of all
cases are affected because of illegal confessions).
259. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319 (1990).
260. Rhode Island v. Inms, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
261. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Of course, one might well ask
about the alternative. See Wermiel, supra note 12, at 14 ("A captain told me 25 years ago
you just use your head. If you think it's right, you can do it; if you don't, you can't. That
used to work, but it doesn't mean a damn anymore.") (quoting a North Carolina police
detective).
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line which made the Court's decision in Miranda so appealing and
workable. 2 2 This rule consists of five parts:

(1) Custody Today, the Court considers whether law enforcement officials deprived the defendant of the freedom of movement
in a significant way The proposed rule accepts this inquiry but
broadens it by also applying the rule to cases in which law enforcement officials interrogate an individual suspected of a crime.
262. These state judges make the point effectively. In Satter v. Solem, 434 N.W.2d 725
(S.D. 1989), the court held that:
The suggestion that Satter's previous experience with the criminal justice
system excuses the giving of any warning is rather unique. The State, and the
dissent in Satter I, seem to suggest that there should be some sort of intelligence test. If the suspect has four previous convictions, he is sufficiently knowledgeable of his Miranda rights. But what if there are three convictions, two, or
only one? Where do we draw the line? More importantly, where do the law
enforcement authorities draw the line? They are the ones in the field. The
creation of exceptions really does them no favor. Far better to adhere to the
bright line rule. After all, it requires no great effort to take out the Miranda
card, read the subject his rights, and ask the simple questions: Do you understand your rights and do you waive them?
Id. at 727.
The Texas Supreme Court in McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1989), held
that:
Establishing a bright line rule relative to when a "critical stage" of the criminal process arises under Art. I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution will have similar
beneficial consequences. Further, the creation of a bright line rule results in
predictability. In addition, judicial review can be more precise, but, most important, it gives law enforcement authorities the parameters within which they
can legally operate. At the present time law enforcement has to speculate
whether a stage in the process is critical so as to compel the necessity of counsel. Speculation about one's legal right is a burden law enforcement should not
have to carry.
Id. at 76.
In Saucier v. State, 562 So. 2d 1238 (Miss. 1990), a dissenting judge argued that:
The bright-line form of the Miranda-Edwards-Jackson-Robersonrule is all
the more remarkable when so much of today's federal criminal constitutional
procedural jurisprudence is presented in the form of balancing tests, cost-benefit analyses, attended often by searches for totalities of circumstances, all of
which are but opportunities, if not invitations, to those who would evade and
avoid to do precisely that. In sharp contrast the Roberson Court noted
We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line rule in
cases following Edwards as well as Miranda.
This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the state alike, has been thought to
outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes upon law
enforcement agencies.
Id. at 1248 (Robertson, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681-82
(1987)).
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(2) Interrogation.The current definition is a fair one, covering
any actions by the police reasonably likely to elicit a response. My
suggestion is that this definition be supplemented by including two
other situations: cases in which the officers intended to elicit an
incriminating response and cases in which the suspect believed he
was undergoing interrogation.
(3) The Warnings. The Court has allowed law officers to drift
away from the four warnings set forth in Miranda. Currently,
courts ask whether the warnings given reasonably conveyed the
suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. Instead, courts should require
the police to give the warnings as explicitly set forth in Miranda or
demonstrate that any deviation from those warnings could not
have led to confusion regarding the privilege against selfincrimination.
(4) The Resumption of Questioning. If a person asks to speak
with an attorney, all questioning must cease and not be resumed.
Currently, however, if a person asks to remain silent, in some, not
very precisely defined situations, the interrogator can later resume
questioning. I propose treating both cases the same. If the person
does not wish to speak, either because of a desire to see a lawyer or
a desire to remain silent, questioning cannot resume.
(5) Waiver The present system requires courts to weigh the totality of circumstances to determine if the defendant freely and
knowingly waived rights under the Fifth Amendment. My proposal
would retain this system, but additionally would require an explicit
waiver, some clear expression by the defendant of an understanding of her constitutional protections and the relinquishment of
those rights.
These proposed rules will not eliminate all of the problems relating to confessions and interrogations. Questions will still exist as to
the suspects' understanding, the impact of Miranda requirements
on law enforcement investigations, and the policies behind Miranda. Even this concrete plan will require some factual inquiries,
but overall, the rule will provide far more guidance to all and will
entail fewer specific fact finding procedures. My suggestions pro-
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vide the bright line praised by Justice O'Connor 26 3 and initiated by
Chief Justice Warren more than twenty-five years ago.

263. Justice O'Connor's most recent statement is somewhat less enthusiastic:
Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves. The task of determming whether a defendant is in "custody" has proved to be "a slippery one."
And the supposedly "bright" lines that separate interrogation from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and the adequate warning
from the inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and ill-defined.
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1735, 1764 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

